📝 Session 10 Slide Outline: Development and the Environment

Author

Affiliation

Published

27 11 2026

Modified

22 06 2026

Instructions for Claude Design: This document contains the full content for each slide in Session 10. Each slide entry includes the title, subtitle, body content, visual instructions, and (where relevant) a note on the slide’s purpose. Section divider slides are clearly marked. Follow the EUF slide template provided. The session has 28 numbered content slides plus 7 unnumbered section divider slides (35 slides total).

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

SLIDE 1 — Title slide

Title: Development and the Environment

Subtitle: Sustainability, Environmental Limits, and Degrowth

Further text: - Development Economics — Session 10 - 27 November 2026

Footer: Prof. Dr. Claudius Gräbner-Radkowitsch | Europa-Universität Flensburg & Institut für die Gesamtanalyse der Wirtschaft (JKU Linz)

[VISUAL] Standard title slide layout from template. EUF and JKU logos in footer.

SLIDE 2 — Learning objectives

Title: Learning objectives

Body:

After this session, students will be able to:

Explain the bidirectional relationship between development and the environment
Describe the Environmentalism of the Poor and its significance for development debates
Read and interpret key empirical data on growth and environmental impact
Explain the Doughnut Economics framework and its limitations
Understand the core arguments in the degrowth vs. green growth debate, including the Warlenius (2023) critique
Critically assess claims about decoupling and its feasibility

SLIDE 3 — Agenda

Title: Agenda

Body (numbered list):

The Development-Environment Nexus
Environmentalism of the Poor
What does the data tell us?
The Doughnut Economics Framework
Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth
Discussion
Synthesis

SLIDE 4 — Opening: A fundamental tension

Title: A fundamental tension

Body (two-column quote layout):

Left column — Jason Hickel (2020): > “In sum, it is irrational to hope, against the evidence, that our existing (growth-based) economic system will deliver the development outcomes we want while at the same time reversing ecological breakdown.”

Right column — Max Roser (2021): > “The reason that such large economic growth is necessary to reduce global poverty is that the world is still very poor. I think that those who don’t see the importance of growth are not aware of the extent of global poverty.”

Bottom box (highlighted): → Who is right? And how could we settle this empirically? → This is the central tension of this session.

[VISUAL] Two-column layout. Portraits of Hickel (left, black-and-white) and Roser (right, colour) aligned with their quotes. Bottom highlighted box spans full width. See T3 slides for portrait images already prepared.

PART 2: THE DEVELOPMENT-ENVIRONMENT NEXUS

DIVIDER SLIDE — “The Development-Environment Nexus”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title slide. Dark blue background, white text. Standard template section divider style.

SLIDE 5 — A bidirectional relationship

Title: The development-environment nexus Subtitle: A bidirectional relationship

Body (diagram with explanatory text):

Two causal channels:

Environmental degradation → Development outcomes
- Environmental conditions shape what development is possible
Development activities → Environmental impacts
- How economies grow shapes the environment they depend on

Key insight: The relationship is not one-directional — and it plays out differently depending on development level, geography, and historical context.

[VISUAL] Two-row diagram with labelled boxes and arrows (as in draft slide 5, already prepared): - Row 1: [Environmental degradation] ──orange arrow──▶ [Development outcomes] - Row 2: [Environmental impacts] ◀──dark arrow── [Development activities] Boxes in the EUF brand colour palette. Text below diagram: “Key insight: …”

SLIDE 6 — Development → Environment

Title: The development-environment nexus Subtitle: Development outcomes → Environment

Body:

Multiple channels through which economic development affects the environment:

Scale effect: More production → more resource use and pollution
Composition effect: Structural change (e.g. shift to industry) → different environmental footprint
Technique effect: New technologies → potentially lower impact per unit of output

These effects can work in opposite directions — the net result varies by context, development level, and policy choice. Whether development ultimately improves or worsens environmental conditions is an empirical and political question.

[VISUAL] Three bullet points, each with a bold label. Clean text layout, no figure. Labels in brand colour. Based on draft slide 7 content.

SLIDE 7 — Environment → Development

Title: The development-environment nexus Subtitle: Environmental degradation → Development outcomes

Body:

Environmental degradation hits developing countries disproportionately hard:

Climate change impacts: floods, droughts, sea-level rise, extreme weather events
Resource depletion: water scarcity, soil degradation, fisheries collapse
Health costs: air pollution, water contamination, disease burden
Economic disruption: agricultural losses, disaster reconstruction costs, infrastructure damage

A core injustice: Those least responsible for global environmental degradation tend to suffer its consequences most severely — and have the fewest resources to adapt.

[VISUAL] Bullet list with bold lead-ins. The final line (“A core injustice”) in a highlighted callout box. This sets up the next section on the Environmentalism of the Poor.

PART 3: ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR

DIVIDER SLIDE — “Environmentalism of the Poor”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous divider.

SLIDE 8 — The Environmentalism of the Poor

Title: The Environmentalism of the Poor Subtitle: Joan Martínez Alier (*1939)

Body:

Poor communities are most dependent on environmental resources for their livelihoods:
- Subsistence farming, fishing, forestry
- No financial buffers to substitute market alternatives when ecosystems degrade
They are least able to adapt to environmental shocks:
- Limited access to insurance, credit, infrastructure, technology
They have different stakes in environmental protection than wealthy countries:
- For the poor, environmental quality is a matter of survival — not a lifestyle preference or post-material concern

[VISUAL] Two-panel layout: left panel shows the book cover of The Environmentalism of the Poor (Joan Martínez Alier, EE) and a portrait of Martínez Alier. Right panel contains the bullet text. See draft slide 6 — the layout and images are already prepared.

SLIDE 9 — Different stakes, different framing

Title: Environmentalism of the Poor Subtitle: What this means for the development-environment debate

Body:

The dominant framing pits development against environmental protection: - “You can grow now and clean up later” (EKC logic) - “We must choose between poverty reduction and ecological sustainability”

The Environmentalism of the Poor challenges this framing:

For many of the world’s poor, a degraded environment means a degraded livelihood — environmental protection and poverty reduction are often complementary
Environmental movements in the Global South often emerge from resource conflicts, not from post-material preferences (examples: Chipko movement in India; delta communities in Bangladesh; pastoralists in the Sahel)
The relevant question is not just: how much growth? — but whose growth? and at whose environmental cost?

[VISUAL] Two-section layout: top box (grey background) contains the “dominant framing” bullets; below, a green-accent section contains the three bullet challenge. This contrast communicates the reframing clearly.

PART 4: WHAT DOES THE DATA TELL US?

DIVIDER SLIDE — “What Does the Data Tell Us?”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers.

SLIDE 10 — Global trends: still coupled

Title: What does the data tell us? Subtitle: Global trends: GDP, GHG emissions, and material footprint

Body:

At the global level, economic growth and environmental pressure have moved together since 1970:
- Global GDP has grown substantially
- Global GHG emissions have grown alongside it
- Global material footprint has grown at a similar rate
Relative decoupling (emissions per $ GDP declining) exists in many economies — but:
Absolute decoupling (total impact falling while GDP grows) is rare, fragile, and has not occurred at the global scale

Bottom line: We have not yet separated global economic growth from global environmental pressure.

[VISUAL] Line chart: three lines (Global GHG emissions, Material footprint, Global GDP), indexed to 1970 = 1, running to ~2020. Source: EEA (2021), as used in T8 slide 13. Left side of slide. Right side: the three bullet points. Keep it clean — the chart is the main message.

SLIDE 11 — Country variation: a range of outcomes

Title: What does the data tell us? Subtitle: Country-level variation in decoupling

Body:

Some high-income countries show absolute decoupling in production-based CO₂ emissions:
- Germany, France, Sweden: emissions fell while GDP grew (energy policy, de-industrialisation, renewable transition)
- But: consumption-based emissions show much weaker decoupling — some environmental pressure has been “offshored” via trade
Low- and lower-middle-income countries remain strongly coupled — and given their development needs, this is to be expected
Some dramatic “decouplings” (e.g. Russia in the 1990s) were driven by economic collapse, not policy

[VISUAL] Multi-panel chart: per capita CO₂ and GDP indexed change for France, Germany, Sweden, USA, EU, Low-income countries, Lower-middle-income countries (from T8 slide 13, OWID data). Alternatively: the per capita CO₂ time series for Russia, Denmark, France, Sweden from Warlenius (2023) Fig. 1 makes the heterogeneity vivid. Use whichever renders more clearly at slide size. Source label required.

SLIDE 12 — Key message: past is no reliable guide to the future

Title: What does the data tell us? Subtitle: The fundamental uncertainty

Body:

What the data shows: - Relative decoupling in many places for some indicators - Absolute decoupling in a few high-income countries for production-based CO₂ - Never globally, and never at the rates that climate targets require

What the data does NOT show: - That the relationships we have observed will remain stable in the future - The link between GDP and environmental impact depends on technologies, institutions, policies, cultural patterns — all of which can change

The meta-question: how malleable are these relationships?

Green growth advocates: these relationships are historically contingent — innovation and policy can break the link
Degrowth advocates: these relationships are constrained by biophysical laws — we cannot rely on technological optimism that history does not support

[VISUAL] Two-column layout for the “What the data shows / does not show” section. Bottom: a wide highlighted box containing the “meta-question” and the two advocate positions.

PART 5: THE DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS FRAMEWORK

DIVIDER SLIDE — “The Doughnut Economics Framework”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers.

SLIDE 13 — From planetary boundaries to the Doughnut

Title: The Doughnut Economics Framework Subtitle: Building on planetary boundaries

Body:

The Planetary Boundaries framework (Richardson et al., 2023):

Identifies nine Earth system processes critical for maintaining Holocene-like conditions
Defines a “safe operating space”: within which human civilisation has developed over the past 10,000 years
Current status: 6 of 9 boundaries already transgressed (climate change, biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater, biogeochemical flows, novel entities)
→ Holocene → Anthropocene: humanity has become a geological force

The gap: The planetary boundaries framework defines ecological limits — but says nothing about social justice or human needs. The Doughnut fills this gap.

[VISUAL] The planetary boundaries circular diagram from Richardson et al. (2023) — as prepared in draft slide 8. Place on the right half of the slide; bullet text on the left. The gap/transition statement runs full-width below.

SLIDE 14 — The Doughnut: two boundaries

Title: The Doughnut Economics Framework 🍩 Subtitle: Kate Raworth’s model (Fanning & Raworth, 2025)

Body:

Two boundaries define the “safe and just space”:

Outer ring (ecological ceiling): 9 planetary boundaries — what we must not exceed
Inner ring (social foundation): 12 dimensions of human wellbeing — what everyone needs:
- Food | Water | Health | Education | Income & work | Peace & justice
- Political voice | Social equity | Gender equality | Housing | Connectivity | Energy

The goal: economies that allow all people to thrive within planetary limits

Connection to Session 3: The social foundation maps closely onto Sen’s capabilities approach — these are the basic capabilities people need to lead a flourishing life.

[VISUAL] The Doughnut diagram from Fanning & Raworth (2025) — as prepared in draft slide 10. Place prominently (right half or centred). Bullet text left or below. Keep diagram large enough to read the labels. Source: “Fanning & Raworth (2025); values shown are for 2022.”

SLIDE 15 — Where do countries stand?

Title: The Doughnut Economics Framework Subtitle: No country is yet in the safe and just space

Body:

Empirical finding (Fanning & Raworth, 2025):

High-income countries: meet most social foundation dimensions — but overshoot multiple ecological boundaries
Low-income countries: mostly within ecological boundaries — but fall short on the social foundation
The “sweet spot”: largely empty — no country currently meets human needs within planetary limits

This is a stark result: it suggests that existing development models need to change, not just be scaled up or replicated.

[VISUAL] Country positioning figure from Fanning & Raworth (2025) — showing countries in relation to the two rings. If the exact figure is not available for reproduction, a schematic with labelled quadrants (overshoot + social shortfall; overshoot + social ok; within planetary limits + social shortfall; within planetary limits + social ok) with example countries placed in each quadrant is an acceptable substitute.

SLIDE 16 — Critical perspectives on the Doughnut

Title: The Doughnut Economics Framework Subtitle: Strengths and limitations

Body:

Strengths: - Intuitive visual framework integrating social and ecological dimensions simultaneously - Empirically grounded and regularly updated (Fanning & Raworth, 2025) - Moves beyond GDP as the sole measure of progress - Connects Earth system science with social justice

Limitations (Anvaari, 2025 — decolonial Marxist critique): - The framework obscures structural inequalities and colonial legacies behind a neutral-looking diagram - Applying equal ecological boundaries to all countries ignores historical responsibility for overshoot - Missing: unequal exchange, global value chains, imperial modes of living - Risk of depoliticisation: technical framing makes political choices appear as design problems

Operationalisation question: Who decides the thresholds? What policies would actually achieve the goal?

[VISUAL] Two-column layout: Strengths (left, green accent), Limitations (right, amber accent). The “Operationalisation question” as a bottom-spanning callout box.

PART 6: GROWTH, GREEN GROWTH, AND DEGROWTH

DIVIDER SLIDE — “Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers.

SLIDE 17 — The core debate

Title: Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth Subtitle: Economic growth without environmental destruction?

Body (two-column):

Green Growth (mainstream position): - Continued GDP growth is compatible with achieving climate and environmental goals - Mechanism: absolute decoupling through technological innovation + policy - Promoted by OECD, World Bank, most governments - Rests on the assumption that decoupling can be achieved fast enough and at sufficient scale

Degrowth: - Continuous GDP growth is incompatible with ecological limits in wealthy countries - Advocates: deliberate reduction of energy and material throughput in the Global North - Not: recession, austerity, or poverty - Not: equal reduction of all economic activity - Key: selective contraction in wealthy countries — while enabling development in the Global South

Important distinction (Schmelzer, 2023): This is a growth critique, not merely a GDP critique — degrowth is not about switching to a better scorecard.

[VISUAL] Two-column layout with clear labels. “Green Growth” left (blue accent), “Degrowth” right (green accent). The important distinction at the bottom spans both columns in a neutral box.

SLIDE 18 — Types of decoupling

Title: Types of decoupling Subtitle: Some crucial distinctions

Body:

Relative decoupling: environmental impact per unit of GDP decreases — but total impact still grows
- Common in many countries for some indicators
- Not sufficient if the goal is to reduce total environmental pressure
Absolute decoupling: total environmental impact falls even as GDP grows
- Rarer; found in some high-income countries for production-based CO₂
- This is what green growth requires
Further distinctions: global vs. local; production-based vs. consumption-based; permanent vs. temporary

[VISUAL] Three-panel chart showing country examples of each type (from T8 slide 9): - Left panel: Indonesia — permanent coupling (material use and GDP rising together) - Centre panel: China — relative decoupling (GDP grows faster than GHG) - Right panel: Germany — absolute decoupling (GDP grows, GHG falls) Source: World Bank. Note below: “Coupling relationships cannot be inferred from co-variation alone — causation requires separate argumentation.”

SLIDE 19 — The IPAT identity

Title: The IPAT identity Subtitle: A framework for thinking about growth and environmental impact

Body:

\[I = P \times A \times T\]

Symbol	Meaning	Example
I	Environmental Impact	CO₂ emissions
P	Population	World population
A	Affluence	GDP per capita
T	Technology	Impact per unit of GDP (= inverse of decoupling)

Key properties: - A mathematical identity — true at every point in time by definition - Decoupling = reducing T (impact intensity per $ of GDP) - Degrowth = reducing A (GDP per capita) to drive down I

Important caveats (often forgotten): - IPAT is a static identity — it does not imply fixed proportional relationships over time - A and T may be interdependent: higher GDP can fund R&D → better technology → lower T - Relationships may be non-linear: these caveats are central to the Warlenius debate

[VISUAL] Display the formula prominently (large, centred, in display math style). The symbol table below. Two-column for the caveats: left “Key properties”, right “Important caveats”. Both sections brief.

SLIDE 20 — Hickel & Kallis (2020)

Title: Hickel & Kallis (2020) Subtitle: “Is Green Growth Possible?” — The bleak prospects for decoupling

Body:

Core empirical finding: - Data shows evidence of absolute decoupling in some places — but not at sufficient rates - Review of existing empirical models: the most optimistic scenario (C-ROADS) yields at most 4% annual decoupling - “4% is beyond what existing empirical models indicate is feasible”

The argument (via IPAT): - Climate targets (1.5°C) require approximately 10% annual emission reductions - If maximum feasible decoupling is 4%, the remaining 6% must come from reducing A - → Degrowth (reducing GDP per capita) is the only viable path in wealthy countries

Conclusion: - Meeting climate targets is incompatible with continued GDP growth in the Global North - The Global South should pursue development — but differently from Northern consumption models

[VISUAL] Left: journal paper cover thumbnail (New Political Economy). Right: the argument as a flow diagram — three boxes connected with arrows: “Max. decoupling: 4%” + “Required emission reduction: 10%” → “Required GDP change: −4%+ per year”. Simple and clear.

SLIDE 21 — Warlenius (2023): The question

Title: Warlenius (2023) Subtitle: “The limits to degrowth: economic and climatic consequences of pessimist assumptions on decoupling”

Body:

Starting point: Warlenius accepts Hickel & Kallis’s pessimism about decoupling — and asks the next question.

The question: If decoupling is indeed capped at 4% and climate targets require ~10% annual emission reductions, how much GDP contraction would actually be needed?

The calculation:

\[\text{1.5°C target} \rightarrow \text{~10\% annual emission reduction}\] \[+ \text{ max. decoupling: 4\%}\] \[\Rightarrow \text{GDP must shrink ~4\% per year}\] \[\Rightarrow \text{After 30 years: economy 86\% smaller}\]

Assumptions embedded in the calculation: - Decoupling rates are independent of the level of affluence (A and T do not interact) - GDP contraction happens instantly with no political economy frictions - Global income convergence: all countries converge to the same per capita GDP

[VISUAL] Left: journal paper cover thumbnail (Ecological Economics, 2023). Right: the calculation as a clean flow diagram — four connected boxes (as in T8 slide 16). Each box is clearly labelled. The “assumptions” at the bottom in a separate note box with a lighter background. Source: Warlenius (2023).

SLIDE 22 — Warlenius (2023): The results

Title: Warlenius (2023) Subtitle: What the numbers imply

Body:

Result under the 1.5°C scenario (4% decoupling, 10% annual emission reduction, income convergence):

Selected GDP per capita changes after 30 years:

Country / Group	GDP per capita (2021)	Change after 30 years (1.5°C)
USA	$69,287	−98%
Germany	$51,204	−97%
EU	$38,234	−96%
Brazil	$7,519	−82%
China	$12,556	−89%
India	$2,277	−39%
Kenya	$2,007	−31%
Least developed countries	$1,177	+17%

Warlenius’s conclusion:

“It pushes the observer to either give up on ambitious climate targets, on development and fairness goals — or to assume that developed countries would crash their economies.”

His point is not that climate action is impossible — it is that static pessimism about decoupling leads to politically untenable conclusions. His alternative: treat decoupling as a political and social achievement, not a fixed parameter.

[VISUAL] The table (above) on the right half of the slide. On the left: the Warlenius quote in large display text (quote style). Source: Warlenius (2023), Table 3. Diagram 1 from the paper (GDP trajectories under different decoupling rates) can be used instead of or alongside the table if space allows.

SLIDE 23 — The remainder of the debate

Title: The remainder of the debate Subtitle: Jackson, Hickel & Kallis (2024) and Warlenius (2025)

Body:

Jackson, Hickel & Kallis (2024) — response to Warlenius: - Dispute which specific decoupling limits they actually claimed — argue Warlenius overstated their pessimism - Accept the arithmetic but dispute the assumptions (A and T are not independent; income convergence is not the right counterfactual) - Key reframe: degrowth is not about GDP contraction per se, but about restructuring economies toward wellbeing provisioning rather than GDP growth - They did not claim 1.5°C is “out of scope” — only that it is not achievable under continuous GDP growth

Warlenius (2025) — rejoinder: - Maintains his calculations follow directly from Hickel-Kallis’s own stated numbers - The debate has migrated from arithmetic to political economy:

“Our differences revolve around the question of capitalism: can it be expected to stop growing, and is it likely to disappear within short? If the answer to both questions is no, strong decoupling is our best chance to avoid runaway climate change.” — Warlenius (2025)

[VISUAL] Two journal paper cover thumbnails at the top (Jackson et al. 2024 left; Warlenius 2025 right) — as in T8 slide 20. Below: two-column layout matching the two papers. The Warlenius (2025) quote in display-quote style at the bottom, spanning both columns.

SLIDE 24 — What does the debate reveal?

Title: Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth Subtitle: The meta-theoretical stakes

Body:

The debate is ultimately about how malleable the growth-environment relationship is:

Green growth / Warlenius: these relationships are historically contingent — they depend on technologies, institutions, and policies that can be changed through political action. Decoupling is a social and political achievement, not a natural law.
Degrowth / Hickel-Kallis: these relationships are constrained by biophysical laws and thermodynamic limits. Sufficient decoupling is not technologically credible. The only reliable way to reduce environmental impact is to reduce economic scale.

Deeper questions the debate raises: - Does capitalism have an inherent growth imperative? (debt, employment, political legitimacy) - Can political systems act fast enough without GDP growth as the legitimating mechanism? - Is GDP even the right target variable — or should the focus be on material throughput, wellbeing, or capabilities?

No easy resolution: Both pathways face enormous challenges — technical (green growth) and political (degrowth). This is not a failure of reasoning; it reflects the genuine difficulty of the problem.

[VISUAL] Two-row layout: Top row, two boxes side by side — “Green growth / Warlenius” and “Degrowth / Hickel-Kallis” — with their positions summarised. Below: the three “deeper questions” as bullet points. Final sentence in an italic callout box.

PART 7: DISCUSSION

DIVIDER SLIDE — “Discussion”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers.

SLIDE 25 — Discussion exercise

Title: Discussion Subtitle: Is growth the problem, the solution, or neither?

Body:

In small groups — 5 minutes:

Discuss the following question:

Based on what you have heard today: is economic growth primarily the problem, the solution, or neither when it comes to the development-environment nexus?

Two follow-up prompts: 1. What evidence or argument would change your mind? 2. Does your answer change depending on which country you are talking about?

Plenary — 8 minutes: Groups share their positions. Instructor moderates: what are the strongest arguments on each side?

[VISUAL] Clean slide. The main question in large, bold display text (highlighted box, centred). The two follow-up prompts below in smaller text. At the bottom, a simple “small groups → plenary” timeline bar (5 min | 8 min).

PART 8: SYNTHESIS

DIVIDER SLIDE — “Synthesis”

[VISUAL] Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers.

SLIDE 26 — Key takeaways

Title: Key takeaways

Body (numbered):

The relationship is bidirectional — development affects the environment and vice versa, with different dynamics at different income levels and in different contexts.
Environmentalism of the Poor: for poor communities, environmental protection and poverty reduction are often complementary — not in tension. The relevant question is not just “how much growth?” but whose growth and at whose cost.
The data: relative decoupling is real; absolute decoupling is rare and fragile; it has never occurred globally or at the rate climate targets require. But past relationships are not reliable guides to the future.
The Doughnut offers a compelling integrated framework — but does not resolve the political economy barriers to achieving the safe and just space, and obscures historical responsibility.
The degrowth debate cannot be settled by data alone. Warlenius (2023) shows that accepting Hickel-Kallis’s own assumptions leads to conclusions about the scale of GDP contraction that have not been fully confronted by degrowth advocates.
The deeper question is whether the growth-environment relationship is historically contingent (and thus malleable through policy) or biophysically constrained (and thus requiring economic downscaling). This is ultimately a question about capitalism, political feasibility, and the limits of technological change.

SLIDE 27 — Connecting across the course

Title: Connecting across the course

Body (two-column, session by session):

Left column:

Session 2 (Measurement): If not GDP growth, what do we measure? The Doughnut offers alternatives — but measurement alone does not solve political economy barriers.
Session 3 (Capabilities): The Doughnut’s social foundation ≈ Sen’s capabilities; environmental limits affect capability achievement both now and across generations.
Session 4 (Growth models): The Solow model assumes infinite substitutability between capital and natural resources. Ecological economics challenges this: some resources have no substitutes.

Right column:

Session 5 (Institutions): What institutions maintain the growth imperative (debt-based finance, employment models, political legitimacy)? What new institutions would enable a sustainable transition?
Sessions 8–9 (Marxism and dependency theory): Unequal exchange and the Environmentalism of the Poor connect environmental degradation to global power structures and colonial legacies — the issues covered in those sessions reappear here.

SLIDE 28 — References

Title: References

Body:

Anguelovski, I. and Martínez-Alier, J. (2014) “The ‘Environmentalism of the Poor’ revisited,” Ecology and Society.

Anvaari, M. (2025) “The Doughnut and the Divide,” Developing Economics blog.

Fanning, A. L. and Raworth, K. (2025) “Doughnut of social and planetary boundaries monitors a world out of balance,” Nature.

Hickel, J. (2020) “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification,” Globalizations.

Hickel, J. and Kallis, G. (2020) “Is Green Growth Possible?” New Political Economy.

Jackson, T., Hickel, J. and Kallis, G. (2024) “Confronting the dilemma of growth. A response to Warlenius (2023),” Ecological Economics.

Richardson, K. et al. (2023) “Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries,” Science Advances.

Schmelzer, M. (2023) “The growth paradigm,” in Schmelzer, Vansintjan & Vetter, The Future is Degrowth.

Warlenius, R. H. (2023) “The limits to degrowth: economic and climatic consequences of pessimist assumptions on decoupling,” Ecological Economics.

Warlenius, R. H. (2025) “Decoupling pessimism and the dilemma of growth. A reply to Jackson et al. (2024),” Ecological Economics.

[VISUAL] Standard references slide. No special layout required. Keep font size readable (not too small).

Summary: slide count and timing

Section	Slides (incl. divider)	Time
1. Introduction	4	~5 min
2. Development-Environment Nexus	4 (incl. divider)	~8 min
3. Environmentalism of the Poor	3 (incl. divider)	~8 min
4. What does the data tell us?	4 (incl. divider)	~10 min
5. Doughnut Economics	5 (incl. divider)	~15 min
6. Growth, Green Growth, Degrowth	9 (incl. divider)	~22 min
7. Discussion	2 (incl. divider)	~13 min
8. Synthesis	4 (incl. divider)	~9 min
Total	35	~90 min

--- title: "📝 Session 10 Slide Outline: Development and the Environment" date: "2026-11-27" date-modified: last-modified --- > **Instructions for Claude Design**: This document contains the full content for each slide in Session 10. Each slide entry includes the title, subtitle, body content, visual instructions, and (where relevant) a note on the slide's purpose. Section divider slides are clearly marked. Follow the EUF slide template provided. The session has 28 numbered content slides plus 7 unnumbered section divider slides (35 slides total). --- ## PART 1: INTRODUCTION --- ### SLIDE 1 — Title slide **Title:** Development and the Environment **Subtitle:** Sustainability, Environmental Limits, and Degrowth **Further text:** - Development Economics — Session 10 - 27 November 2026 **Footer:** Prof. Dr. Claudius Gräbner-Radkowitsch | Europa-Universität Flensburg & Institut für die Gesamtanalyse der Wirtschaft (JKU Linz) **[VISUAL]** Standard title slide layout from template. EUF and JKU logos in footer. --- ### SLIDE 2 — Learning objectives **Title:** Learning objectives **Body:** After this session, students will be able to: 1. Explain the **bidirectional relationship** between development and the environment 2. Describe the **Environmentalism of the Poor** and its significance for development debates 3. Read and interpret key **empirical data** on growth and environmental impact 4. Explain the **Doughnut Economics framework** and its limitations 5. Understand the core arguments in the **degrowth vs. green growth debate**, including the Warlenius (2023) critique 6. Critically assess claims about **decoupling** and its feasibility --- ### SLIDE 3 — Agenda **Title:** Agenda **Body (numbered list):** 1. The Development-Environment Nexus 2. Environmentalism of the Poor 3. What does the data tell us? 4. The Doughnut Economics Framework 5. Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth 6. Discussion 7. Synthesis --- ### SLIDE 4 — Opening: A fundamental tension **Title:** A fundamental tension **Body (two-column quote layout):** **Left column — Jason Hickel (2020):** > "In sum, it is **irrational to hope**, against the evidence, that our existing (growth-based) economic system will deliver **the development outcomes we want** while at the same time reversing ecological breakdown." **Right column — Max Roser (2021):** > "The reason that such **large economic growth is necessary** to reduce global poverty is that the world is still very poor. I think that those who don't see the importance of growth are not aware of the extent of global poverty." **Bottom box (highlighted):** → Who is right? And how could we settle this empirically? → This is the central tension of this session. **[VISUAL]** Two-column layout. Portraits of Hickel (left, black-and-white) and Roser (right, colour) aligned with their quotes. Bottom highlighted box spans full width. See T3 slides for portrait images already prepared. --- ## PART 2: THE DEVELOPMENT-ENVIRONMENT NEXUS --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "The Development-Environment Nexus" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title slide. Dark blue background, white text. Standard template section divider style. --- ### SLIDE 5 — A bidirectional relationship **Title:** The development-environment nexus **Subtitle:** A bidirectional relationship **Body (diagram with explanatory text):** Two causal channels: - **Environmental degradation → Development outcomes** - Environmental conditions shape what development is possible - **Development activities → Environmental impacts** - How economies grow shapes the environment they depend on **Key insight:** The relationship is not one-directional — and it plays out differently depending on development level, geography, and historical context. **[VISUAL]** Two-row diagram with labelled boxes and arrows (as in draft slide 5, already prepared): - Row 1: [Environmental degradation] ──orange arrow──▶ [Development outcomes] - Row 2: [Environmental impacts] ◀──dark arrow── [Development activities] Boxes in the EUF brand colour palette. Text below diagram: "Key insight: ..." --- ### SLIDE 6 — Development → Environment **Title:** The development-environment nexus **Subtitle:** Development outcomes → Environment **Body:** Multiple channels through which economic development affects the environment: - **Scale effect**: More production → more resource use and pollution - **Composition effect**: Structural change (e.g. shift to industry) → different environmental footprint - **Technique effect**: New technologies → potentially lower impact per unit of output These effects can work in **opposite directions** — the net result varies by context, development level, and policy choice. Whether development ultimately improves or worsens environmental conditions is an empirical and political question. **[VISUAL]** Three bullet points, each with a bold label. Clean text layout, no figure. Labels in brand colour. Based on draft slide 7 content. --- ### SLIDE 7 — Environment → Development **Title:** The development-environment nexus **Subtitle:** Environmental degradation → Development outcomes **Body:** Environmental degradation hits developing countries **disproportionately hard**: - **Climate change impacts**: floods, droughts, sea-level rise, extreme weather events - **Resource depletion**: water scarcity, soil degradation, fisheries collapse - **Health costs**: air pollution, water contamination, disease burden - **Economic disruption**: agricultural losses, disaster reconstruction costs, infrastructure damage **A core injustice:** Those least responsible for global environmental degradation tend to suffer its consequences most severely — and have the fewest resources to adapt. **[VISUAL]** Bullet list with bold lead-ins. The final line ("A core injustice") in a highlighted callout box. This sets up the next section on the Environmentalism of the Poor. --- ## PART 3: ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "Environmentalism of the Poor" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous divider. --- ### SLIDE 8 — The Environmentalism of the Poor **Title:** The Environmentalism of the Poor **Subtitle:** Joan Martínez Alier (*1939) **Body:** - Poor communities are **most dependent** on environmental resources for their livelihoods: - Subsistence farming, fishing, forestry - No financial buffers to substitute market alternatives when ecosystems degrade - They are **least able to adapt** to environmental shocks: - Limited access to insurance, credit, infrastructure, technology - They have **different stakes** in environmental protection than wealthy countries: - For the poor, environmental quality is a matter of survival — not a lifestyle preference or post-material concern **[VISUAL]** Two-panel layout: left panel shows the book cover of *The Environmentalism of the Poor* (Joan Martínez Alier, EE) and a portrait of Martínez Alier. Right panel contains the bullet text. See draft slide 6 — the layout and images are already prepared. --- ### SLIDE 9 — Different stakes, different framing **Title:** Environmentalism of the Poor **Subtitle:** What this means for the development-environment debate **Body:** The dominant framing pits development **against** environmental protection: - "You can grow now and clean up later" (EKC logic) - "We must choose between poverty reduction and ecological sustainability" **The Environmentalism of the Poor challenges this framing:** - For many of the world's poor, a degraded environment means a degraded livelihood — environmental protection and poverty reduction are often **complementary** - Environmental movements in the Global South often emerge from **resource conflicts**, not from post-material preferences (examples: Chipko movement in India; delta communities in Bangladesh; pastoralists in the Sahel) - The relevant question is not just: *how much growth?* — but *whose growth?* and *at whose environmental cost?* **[VISUAL]** Two-section layout: top box (grey background) contains the "dominant framing" bullets; below, a green-accent section contains the three bullet challenge. This contrast communicates the reframing clearly. --- ## PART 4: WHAT DOES THE DATA TELL US? --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "What Does the Data Tell Us?" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers. --- ### SLIDE 10 — Global trends: still coupled **Title:** What does the data tell us? **Subtitle:** Global trends: GDP, GHG emissions, and material footprint **Body:** - At the **global level**, economic growth and environmental pressure have moved together since 1970: - Global GDP has grown substantially - Global GHG emissions have grown alongside it - Global material footprint has grown at a similar rate - **Relative decoupling** (emissions per $ GDP declining) exists in many economies — but: - **Absolute decoupling** (total impact falling while GDP grows) is rare, fragile, and has **not occurred at the global scale** **Bottom line:** We have not yet separated global economic growth from global environmental pressure. **[VISUAL]** Line chart: three lines (Global GHG emissions, Material footprint, Global GDP), indexed to 1970 = 1, running to ~2020. Source: EEA (2021), as used in T8 slide 13. Left side of slide. Right side: the three bullet points. Keep it clean — the chart is the main message. --- ### SLIDE 11 — Country variation: a range of outcomes **Title:** What does the data tell us? **Subtitle:** Country-level variation in decoupling **Body:** - Some high-income countries show **absolute decoupling** in production-based CO₂ emissions: - Germany, France, Sweden: emissions fell while GDP grew (energy policy, de-industrialisation, renewable transition) - But: **consumption-based** emissions show much weaker decoupling — some environmental pressure has been "offshored" via trade - Low- and lower-middle-income countries remain strongly coupled — and given their development needs, this is to be expected - Some dramatic "decouplings" (e.g. Russia in the 1990s) were driven by economic collapse, not policy **[VISUAL]** Multi-panel chart: per capita CO₂ and GDP indexed change for France, Germany, Sweden, USA, EU, Low-income countries, Lower-middle-income countries (from T8 slide 13, OWID data). Alternatively: the per capita CO₂ time series for Russia, Denmark, France, Sweden from Warlenius (2023) Fig. 1 makes the heterogeneity vivid. Use whichever renders more clearly at slide size. Source label required. --- ### SLIDE 12 — Key message: past is no reliable guide to the future **Title:** What does the data tell us? **Subtitle:** The fundamental uncertainty **Body:** **What the data shows:** - Relative decoupling in many places for some indicators - Absolute decoupling in a few high-income countries for production-based CO₂ - Never globally, and never at the rates that climate targets require **What the data does NOT show:** - That the relationships we have observed will remain stable in the future - The link between GDP and environmental impact depends on technologies, institutions, policies, cultural patterns — all of which can change **The meta-question: how malleable are these relationships?** - **Green growth advocates**: these relationships are historically contingent — innovation and policy can break the link - **Degrowth advocates**: these relationships are constrained by biophysical laws — we cannot rely on technological optimism that history does not support **[VISUAL]** Two-column layout for the "What the data shows / does not show" section. Bottom: a wide highlighted box containing the "meta-question" and the two advocate positions. --- ## PART 5: THE DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS FRAMEWORK --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "The Doughnut Economics Framework" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers. --- ### SLIDE 13 — From planetary boundaries to the Doughnut **Title:** The Doughnut Economics Framework **Subtitle:** Building on planetary boundaries **Body:** **The Planetary Boundaries framework** (Richardson et al., 2023): - Identifies nine Earth system processes critical for maintaining Holocene-like conditions - Defines a **"safe operating space"**: within which human civilisation has developed over the past 10,000 years - **Current status**: 6 of 9 boundaries already transgressed (climate change, biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater, biogeochemical flows, novel entities) - → Holocene → **Anthropocene**: humanity has become a geological force **The gap**: The planetary boundaries framework defines ecological limits — but says nothing about **social justice or human needs**. The Doughnut fills this gap. **[VISUAL]** The planetary boundaries circular diagram from Richardson et al. (2023) — as prepared in draft slide 8. Place on the right half of the slide; bullet text on the left. The gap/transition statement runs full-width below. --- ### SLIDE 14 — The Doughnut: two boundaries **Title:** The Doughnut Economics Framework 🍩 **Subtitle:** Kate Raworth's model (Fanning & Raworth, 2025) **Body:** Two boundaries define the "safe and just space": - **Outer ring (ecological ceiling)**: 9 planetary boundaries — what we must not exceed - **Inner ring (social foundation)**: 12 dimensions of human wellbeing — what everyone needs: - Food | Water | Health | Education | Income & work | Peace & justice - Political voice | Social equity | Gender equality | Housing | Connectivity | Energy **The goal**: economies that allow **all people to thrive within planetary limits** **Connection to Session 3**: The social foundation maps closely onto Sen's capabilities approach — these are the basic capabilities people need to lead a flourishing life. **[VISUAL]** The Doughnut diagram from Fanning & Raworth (2025) — as prepared in draft slide 10. Place prominently (right half or centred). Bullet text left or below. Keep diagram large enough to read the labels. Source: "Fanning & Raworth (2025); values shown are for 2022." --- ### SLIDE 15 — Where do countries stand? **Title:** The Doughnut Economics Framework **Subtitle:** No country is yet in the safe and just space **Body:** **Empirical finding** (Fanning & Raworth, 2025): - **High-income countries**: meet most social foundation dimensions — but overshoot multiple ecological boundaries - **Low-income countries**: mostly within ecological boundaries — but fall short on the social foundation - **The "sweet spot"**: largely empty — no country currently meets human needs within planetary limits This is a stark result: it suggests that existing development models need to change, not just be scaled up or replicated. **[VISUAL]** Country positioning figure from Fanning & Raworth (2025) — showing countries in relation to the two rings. If the exact figure is not available for reproduction, a schematic with labelled quadrants (overshoot + social shortfall; overshoot + social ok; within planetary limits + social shortfall; within planetary limits + social ok) with example countries placed in each quadrant is an acceptable substitute. --- ### SLIDE 16 — Critical perspectives on the Doughnut **Title:** The Doughnut Economics Framework **Subtitle:** Strengths and limitations **Body:** **Strengths:** - Intuitive visual framework integrating social and ecological dimensions simultaneously - Empirically grounded and regularly updated (Fanning & Raworth, 2025) - Moves beyond GDP as the sole measure of progress - Connects Earth system science with social justice **Limitations (Anvaari, 2025 — decolonial Marxist critique):** - The framework obscures structural inequalities and colonial legacies behind a neutral-looking diagram - Applying equal ecological boundaries to all countries ignores **historical responsibility** for overshoot - Missing: unequal exchange, global value chains, imperial modes of living - Risk of **depoliticisation**: technical framing makes political choices appear as design problems **Operationalisation question**: Who decides the thresholds? What policies would actually achieve the goal? **[VISUAL]** Two-column layout: Strengths (left, green accent), Limitations (right, amber accent). The "Operationalisation question" as a bottom-spanning callout box. --- ## PART 6: GROWTH, GREEN GROWTH, AND DEGROWTH --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers. --- ### SLIDE 17 — The core debate **Title:** Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth **Subtitle:** Economic growth without environmental destruction? **Body (two-column):** **Green Growth (mainstream position):** - Continued GDP growth is **compatible** with achieving climate and environmental goals - Mechanism: **absolute decoupling** through technological innovation + policy - Promoted by OECD, World Bank, most governments - Rests on the assumption that decoupling can be achieved fast enough and at sufficient scale **Degrowth:** - Continuous GDP growth is **incompatible** with ecological limits in wealthy countries - Advocates: deliberate reduction of energy and material throughput in the Global North - Not: recession, austerity, or poverty - Not: equal reduction of all economic activity - Key: selective contraction in wealthy countries — while enabling development in the Global South **Important distinction** (Schmelzer, 2023): This is a **growth critique**, not merely a GDP critique — degrowth is not about switching to a better scorecard. **[VISUAL]** Two-column layout with clear labels. "Green Growth" left (blue accent), "Degrowth" right (green accent). The important distinction at the bottom spans both columns in a neutral box. --- ### SLIDE 18 — Types of decoupling **Title:** Types of decoupling **Subtitle:** Some crucial distinctions **Body:** - **Relative decoupling**: environmental impact per unit of GDP decreases — but total impact still grows - Common in many countries for some indicators - Not sufficient if the goal is to reduce total environmental pressure - **Absolute decoupling**: total environmental impact falls even as GDP grows - Rarer; found in some high-income countries for production-based CO₂ - This is what green growth *requires* - Further distinctions: global vs. local; production-based vs. consumption-based; permanent vs. temporary **[VISUAL]** Three-panel chart showing country examples of each type (from T8 slide 9): - Left panel: Indonesia — permanent coupling (material use and GDP rising together) - Centre panel: China — relative decoupling (GDP grows faster than GHG) - Right panel: Germany — absolute decoupling (GDP grows, GHG falls) Source: World Bank. Note below: "Coupling relationships cannot be inferred from co-variation alone — causation requires separate argumentation." --- ### SLIDE 19 — The IPAT identity **Title:** The IPAT identity **Subtitle:** A framework for thinking about growth and environmental impact **Body:** $$I = P \times A \times T$$ | Symbol | Meaning | Example | |--------|---------|---------| | **I** | Environmental Impact | CO₂ emissions | | **P** | Population | World population | | **A** | Affluence | GDP per capita | | **T** | Technology | Impact per unit of GDP (= inverse of decoupling) | **Key properties:** - A **mathematical identity** — true at every point in time by definition - **Decoupling** = reducing T (impact intensity per $ of GDP) - **Degrowth** = reducing A (GDP per capita) to drive down I **Important caveats (often forgotten):** - IPAT is a static identity — it does **not** imply fixed proportional relationships over time - A and T may be **interdependent**: higher GDP can fund R&D → better technology → lower T - Relationships may be **non-linear**: these caveats are central to the Warlenius debate **[VISUAL]** Display the formula prominently (large, centred, in display math style). The symbol table below. Two-column for the caveats: left "Key properties", right "Important caveats". Both sections brief. --- ### SLIDE 20 — Hickel & Kallis (2020) **Title:** Hickel & Kallis (2020) **Subtitle:** "Is Green Growth Possible?" — The bleak prospects for decoupling **Body:** **Core empirical finding:** - Data shows evidence of absolute decoupling in some places — but not at sufficient rates - Review of existing empirical models: the most optimistic scenario (C-ROADS) yields at most **4% annual decoupling** - "4% is beyond what existing empirical models indicate is feasible" **The argument (via IPAT):** - Climate targets (1.5°C) require approximately **10% annual emission reductions** - If maximum feasible decoupling is 4%, the remaining 6% must come from reducing A - → **Degrowth** (reducing GDP per capita) is the only viable path in wealthy countries **Conclusion:** - Meeting climate targets is incompatible with continued GDP growth in the Global North - The Global South should pursue development — but **differently** from Northern consumption models **[VISUAL]** Left: journal paper cover thumbnail (New Political Economy). Right: the argument as a flow diagram — three boxes connected with arrows: "Max. decoupling: 4%" + "Required emission reduction: 10%" → "Required GDP change: −4%+ per year". Simple and clear. --- ### SLIDE 21 — Warlenius (2023): The question **Title:** Warlenius (2023) **Subtitle:** "The limits to degrowth: economic and climatic consequences of pessimist assumptions on decoupling" **Body:** **Starting point:** Warlenius *accepts* Hickel & Kallis's pessimism about decoupling — and asks the next question. **The question:** If decoupling is indeed capped at 4% and climate targets require ~10% annual emission reductions, *how much GDP contraction would actually be needed?* **The calculation:** $$\text{1.5°C target} \rightarrow \text{~10\% annual emission reduction}$$ $$+ \text{ max. decoupling: 4\%}$$ $$\Rightarrow \text{GDP must shrink ~4\% per year}$$ $$\Rightarrow \text{After 30 years: economy 86\% smaller}$$ **Assumptions embedded in the calculation:** - Decoupling rates are **independent** of the level of affluence (A and T do not interact) - GDP contraction happens **instantly** with no political economy frictions - Global **income convergence**: all countries converge to the same per capita GDP **[VISUAL]** Left: journal paper cover thumbnail (Ecological Economics, 2023). Right: the calculation as a clean flow diagram — four connected boxes (as in T8 slide 16). Each box is clearly labelled. The "assumptions" at the bottom in a separate note box with a lighter background. Source: Warlenius (2023). --- ### SLIDE 22 — Warlenius (2023): The results **Title:** Warlenius (2023) **Subtitle:** What the numbers imply **Body:** **Result under the 1.5°C scenario** (4% decoupling, 10% annual emission reduction, income convergence): Selected GDP per capita changes after 30 years: | Country / Group | GDP per capita (2021) | Change after 30 years (1.5°C) | |-----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------| | USA | $69,287 | −98% | | Germany | $51,204 | −97% | | EU | $38,234 | −96% | | Brazil | $7,519 | −82% | | China | $12,556 | −89% | | India | $2,277 | −39% | | Kenya | $2,007 | −31% | | Least developed countries | $1,177 | +17% | **Warlenius's conclusion:** > "It pushes the observer to either give up on ambitious climate targets, on development and fairness goals — or to assume that developed countries would crash their economies." **His point is not** that climate action is impossible — it is that **static pessimism about decoupling** leads to politically untenable conclusions. His alternative: treat decoupling as a **political and social achievement**, not a fixed parameter. **[VISUAL]** The table (above) on the right half of the slide. On the left: the Warlenius quote in large display text (quote style). Source: Warlenius (2023), Table 3. Diagram 1 from the paper (GDP trajectories under different decoupling rates) can be used instead of or alongside the table if space allows. --- ### SLIDE 23 — The remainder of the debate **Title:** The remainder of the debate **Subtitle:** Jackson, Hickel & Kallis (2024) and Warlenius (2025) **Body:** **Jackson, Hickel & Kallis (2024) — response to Warlenius:** - Dispute which specific decoupling limits they actually claimed — argue Warlenius overstated their pessimism - Accept the arithmetic but dispute the assumptions (A and T are not independent; income convergence is not the right counterfactual) - Key reframe: degrowth is not about GDP contraction per se, but about restructuring economies toward **wellbeing provisioning** rather than GDP growth - They did not claim 1.5°C is "out of scope" — only that it is not achievable under continuous GDP growth **Warlenius (2025) — rejoinder:** - Maintains his calculations follow directly from Hickel-Kallis's own stated numbers - The debate has migrated from arithmetic to political economy: > "Our differences revolve around the question of capitalism: can it be expected to stop growing, and is it likely to disappear within short? If the answer to both questions is no, **strong decoupling is our best chance** to avoid runaway climate change." > — Warlenius (2025) **[VISUAL]** Two journal paper cover thumbnails at the top (Jackson et al. 2024 left; Warlenius 2025 right) — as in T8 slide 20. Below: two-column layout matching the two papers. The Warlenius (2025) quote in display-quote style at the bottom, spanning both columns. --- ### SLIDE 24 — What does the debate reveal? **Title:** Growth, Green Growth, and Degrowth **Subtitle:** The meta-theoretical stakes **Body:** **The debate is ultimately about how malleable the growth-environment relationship is:** - **Green growth / Warlenius**: these relationships are **historically contingent** — they depend on technologies, institutions, and policies that can be changed through political action. Decoupling is a social and political achievement, not a natural law. - **Degrowth / Hickel-Kallis**: these relationships are **constrained by biophysical laws** and thermodynamic limits. Sufficient decoupling is not technologically credible. The only reliable way to reduce environmental impact is to reduce economic scale. **Deeper questions the debate raises:** - Does capitalism have an inherent growth imperative? (debt, employment, political legitimacy) - Can political systems act fast enough without GDP growth as the legitimating mechanism? - Is GDP even the right target variable — or should the focus be on material throughput, wellbeing, or capabilities? **No easy resolution:** Both pathways face enormous challenges — technical (green growth) and political (degrowth). This is not a failure of reasoning; it reflects the genuine difficulty of the problem. **[VISUAL]** Two-row layout: Top row, two boxes side by side — "Green growth / Warlenius" and "Degrowth / Hickel-Kallis" — with their positions summarised. Below: the three "deeper questions" as bullet points. Final sentence in an italic callout box. --- ## PART 7: DISCUSSION --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "Discussion" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers. --- ### SLIDE 25 — Discussion exercise **Title:** Discussion **Subtitle:** Is growth the problem, the solution, or neither? **Body:** **In small groups — 5 minutes:** Discuss the following question: > Based on what you have heard today: is economic growth primarily the **problem**, the **solution**, or **neither** when it comes to the development-environment nexus? Two follow-up prompts: 1. What evidence or argument would **change your mind**? 2. Does your answer change depending on **which country** you are talking about? **Plenary — 8 minutes:** Groups share their positions. Instructor moderates: what are the strongest arguments on each side? **[VISUAL]** Clean slide. The main question in large, bold display text (highlighted box, centred). The two follow-up prompts below in smaller text. At the bottom, a simple "small groups → plenary" timeline bar (5 min | 8 min). --- ## PART 8: SYNTHESIS --- ### DIVIDER SLIDE — "Synthesis" **[VISUAL]** Full-page section title. Same style as previous dividers. --- ### SLIDE 26 — Key takeaways **Title:** Key takeaways **Body (numbered):** 1. **The relationship is bidirectional** — development affects the environment and vice versa, with different dynamics at different income levels and in different contexts. 2. **Environmentalism of the Poor**: for poor communities, environmental protection and poverty reduction are often complementary — not in tension. The relevant question is not just "how much growth?" but whose growth and at whose cost. 3. **The data**: relative decoupling is real; absolute decoupling is rare and fragile; it has never occurred globally or at the rate climate targets require. But past relationships are not reliable guides to the future. 4. **The Doughnut** offers a compelling integrated framework — but does not resolve the political economy barriers to achieving the safe and just space, and obscures historical responsibility. 5. **The degrowth debate** cannot be settled by data alone. Warlenius (2023) shows that accepting Hickel-Kallis's own assumptions leads to conclusions about the scale of GDP contraction that have not been fully confronted by degrowth advocates. 6. **The deeper question** is whether the growth-environment relationship is historically contingent (and thus malleable through policy) or biophysically constrained (and thus requiring economic downscaling). This is ultimately a question about capitalism, political feasibility, and the limits of technological change. --- ### SLIDE 27 — Connecting across the course **Title:** Connecting across the course **Body (two-column, session by session):** **Left column:** - **Session 2 (Measurement)**: If not GDP growth, what do we measure? The Doughnut offers alternatives — but measurement alone does not solve political economy barriers. - **Session 3 (Capabilities)**: The Doughnut's social foundation ≈ Sen's capabilities; environmental limits affect capability achievement both now and across generations. - **Session 4 (Growth models)**: The Solow model assumes infinite substitutability between capital and natural resources. Ecological economics challenges this: some resources have no substitutes. **Right column:** - **Session 5 (Institutions)**: What institutions maintain the growth imperative (debt-based finance, employment models, political legitimacy)? What new institutions would enable a sustainable transition? - **Sessions 8–9 (Marxism and dependency theory)**: Unequal exchange and the Environmentalism of the Poor connect environmental degradation to global power structures and colonial legacies — the issues covered in those sessions reappear here. --- ### SLIDE 28 — References **Title:** References **Body:** Anguelovski, I. and Martínez-Alier, J. (2014) "The 'Environmentalism of the Poor' revisited," *Ecology and Society*. Anvaari, M. (2025) "The Doughnut and the Divide," *Developing Economics* blog. Fanning, A. L. and Raworth, K. (2025) "Doughnut of social and planetary boundaries monitors a world out of balance," *Nature*. Hickel, J. (2020) "What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification," *Globalizations*. Hickel, J. and Kallis, G. (2020) "Is Green Growth Possible?" *New Political Economy*. Jackson, T., Hickel, J. and Kallis, G. (2024) "Confronting the dilemma of growth. A response to Warlenius (2023)," *Ecological Economics*. Richardson, K. et al. (2023) "Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries," *Science Advances*. Schmelzer, M. (2023) "The growth paradigm," in Schmelzer, Vansintjan & Vetter, *The Future is Degrowth*. Warlenius, R. H. (2023) "The limits to degrowth: economic and climatic consequences of pessimist assumptions on decoupling," *Ecological Economics*. Warlenius, R. H. (2025) "Decoupling pessimism and the dilemma of growth. A reply to Jackson et al. (2024)," *Ecological Economics*. **[VISUAL]** Standard references slide. No special layout required. Keep font size readable (not too small). --- ## Summary: slide count and timing | Section | Slides (incl. divider) | Time | |---------|----------------------|------| | 1. Introduction | 4 | ~5 min | | 2. Development-Environment Nexus | 4 (incl. divider) | ~8 min | | 3. Environmentalism of the Poor | 3 (incl. divider) | ~8 min | | 4. What does the data tell us? | 4 (incl. divider) | ~10 min | | 5. Doughnut Economics | 5 (incl. divider) | ~15 min | | 6. Growth, Green Growth, Degrowth | 9 (incl. divider) | ~22 min | | 7. Discussion | 2 (incl. divider) | ~13 min | | 8. Synthesis | 4 (incl. divider) | ~9 min | | **Total** | **35** | **~90 min** |